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The argument that there is a link between conflict and the spread of HIV has become 
commonplace in both the academic and policy world. This is particularly so for sub-
Saharan Africa given the combination of an HIV pandemic in the region and high 
levels of violent conflict and state instability. However the link is not straightforward. 
Crucially, despite significant risk factors indicating a relationship between conflict 
and the spread of HIV, empirical evidence exists that HIV does not always increase in 
times of conflict, and that in some conflicts prevalence has decreased. This suggests a 
more complex relationship than originally envisaged. This paper does four things. 
First, it examines the risk factors identified in the early years of this decade which 
indicated a relationship between conflict and the spread of HIV. Second, it discusses 
how empirical evidence began to emerge suggesting a more complex relationship and 
how a number of conflicts demonstrated reduced HIV prevalence despite these risk 
factors. The third section moves beyond risk factors to suggest a framework based on 
susceptibility and vulnerability which explains under what circumstances HIV might  
- and might not - be spread, despite the presence of risk factors. The final section 
examines four cases  - Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda and the DRC - where conflict 
did not lead to a significant increase in the prevalence of HIV, using the previous 
framework as the basis to explain this phenomenon. The paper concludes that, despite 
the fears of a few years ago, conflict does not readily act as a vector for HIV, though 
the potential for this to occur does still exist under certain circumstances. 
 
 








HIV, AIDS and Conflict in Africa: Why Isn’t It (Even) Worse?1 
 
AIDS2 continues to be one of the most significant causes of non-natural death 
worldwide. In its 2008 report on the pandemic, UNAIDS estimated that 2 million 
people died of AIDS in 2007, and that a further 33 million people were living with HIV, 
including 2 million children under 15. The disease however is not evenly spread. By 
far the largest concentration is in sub-Saharan Africa, home to 67% of all those living 
with HIV and 90% of children with HIV.3 Understanding the social as well as 
biological determinants for the spread of this disease has therefore become a priority, 
not least for sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The early years of this decade saw the emergence of a consensus that conflict acted 
as a vector for the spread of HIV. This was particularly so for sub-Saharan Africa: the 
first major epidemic of HIV and AIDS, in Uganda, coincided with the invasion of that 
country; and the combination of high HIV prevalence4 with political instability and 
violence appeared more than coincidental.5 Perhaps the most significant 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful to Marie Woodling for her assistance in researching the case studies for this 
paper. 
2
  AIDS is a syndrome of infections and diseases which develops in human immune systems 
weakened by the virus HIV. Although often linked in the literature as one (typically 
„HIV/AIDS‟), for this paper it is appropriate to separate them. It is HIV which is spread by 
human-to-human contact and the article is concerned with the potential for conflict to 
accelerate this spread; but it is AIDS which kills. 
3
  UNAIDS, 2008 AIDS Epidemic Update (Geneva: UNAIDS/WHO, 2008): 32-3. 
4
 High prevalence is defined as a rate above 3% in the general population. See UNAIDS, 
2008 AIDS Epidemic Update, p.34. 
5
  Paul B. Spiegel, Anne Rygaard Bennedsen, Johanna Claas, Lauire Bruns, Njogu Patterson, 
Dieudonne Yiweza, Marian Schilperoord,  „Prevalence of HIV infection in conflict-affected and 
displaced people in seven sub-Saharan African countries‟, The Lancet  369 (June 2007): 
2187 and 2191; Jeff Gow, „The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa: implications for US policy‟,  
Health Affairs 21 (May/June 2002): 65; Stefan Elbe, „HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of 
war in Africa‟,  International Security 27 (Fall 2002):174;  Dennis Altman, „AIDS and security‟,  
International Relations  17 (December 2003): 421. See also for example Duane Bratt, „Blue 
condoms: the use of international peacekeepers in the fight against AIDS‟, International 
Peacekeeping 9 (Autumn 2002): 72; Peter Fourie and Martin Schonteich, „Africa‟s new 
security threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in Africa‟, African Security Review 10 (2001):6, 
available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/10No4/Fourie.html, subsequent page references 
are to online version; NA Betsi, BG Koudou, G Cisse, AB Tschannen, AM Pignol, Y Ouattara, 
Z Madougou, M Tanner and J Utzinger, „Effect of an armed conflict on human resources and 
health systems in Cote d‟Ivoire‟, AIDS Care 18 (May 2006): 36; S. Verstegen, HIV/AIDS: 
Waking up to the Challenge Working document prepared by Conflict Research Unit, 
Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Ambassador for 
HIV/AIDS, March 2005: 24; Vinh-Kim Nguyen and Katherine Stovel, The Social Science of 
HIV/AIDS: A Critical Review and Priorities for Action Report Prepared by the Social Science 
Research Council Working Group on HIV/AIDS, October 2004: 11-12; Nancy B Mock, Samba 






endorsement of this link came from the UN and especially the Security Council. On 
10 January 2000, at its first meeting of the new millennium, the UN Security Council 
met to discuss the „impact of AIDS on peace and security‟ in Africa.6 Six months later 
it passed Resolution 1308, arguing that the spread of HIV was „exacerbated by 
conditions of violence and insecurity‟.7  
 
This paper does four things. First, it examines the risk factors identified in the early 
years of this decade which indicated a relationship between conflict and the spread 
of HIV. Second, it discusses how empirical evidence began to emerge suggesting a 
more complex relationship and how a number of conflicts demonstrated reduced HIV 
prevalence despite these risk factors. The third section moves beyond risk factors to 
suggest a framework based on susceptibility and vulnerability which explains under 
what circumstances HIV might  - and might not - be spread, despite the presence of 
risk factors. The final section examines four cases  - Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda 
and the DRC - where conflict did not lead to a significant increase in the prevalence 
of HIV, using the previous framework as the basis to explain this phenomenon.  
 
 
Identifying risk factors 
The relationship between conflict and the spread of HIV was supported by the 
identification of a number of risk factors. Perhaps the most commonly expressed of 
these concerned HIV and the military. In a widely cited report in 2001, the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that it had become an „accepted assumption 
… that the rates of HIV are higher among the military and other uniformed forces 
than among the general population.‟8  Working in the military creates an environment 
                                                                                                                                            
Duale, Lisanne F Brown, Ellen Mathys, Heather C O‟Maonaigh, Nina KL Abul-Husn and 
Sterling Elliott, „Conflict and HIV: A framework for risk assessment to prevent HIV in conflict-
affected settings in Africa‟,  Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 1 (October 2004),  available 
from BioMed Central, subsequent page references from the open access version; Timothy 
Docking, AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa USIP Special Report 75 available at 
http://ww.usip.org, 7. 
6
  UN Security Council [UNSC] Press Release SC/6781, 10 January 2000 available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html. 
7
  UNSC Resolution [UNSCR] 1308, July 2000, 2, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html.   
8
  International Crisis Group, HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue in Africa: Lessons from Uganda 
(Kampala/Brussels: ICG, 2004), 1. For a more extensive discussion on this and the reasons 
behind it, see McInnes, „HIV/AIDS and security‟ and  „HIV/AIDS and national security‟. See 
also Eric G. Bing, Daniel Ortiz, Ricardo E. Ovalle-Bahamon, Karen G. Chen, Fannie H. 
Huang, Francisco Ernesto and Naihua Duan, „HIV/AIDS behavioural surveillance among 
Angolan military men‟, AIDS Behaviour, accessed from PubMed PMID 17641966; A. 
Pistorius, G. Gergen and B. Willershausen, „Survey about the knowledge of the HIV infection 






where risk taking is endemic due to the nature of the profession, and this is reflected 
in attitudes towards sex. This attitude may well increase in times of conflict. Moreover 
deployments away from home – again more often in conflict situations - create 
loneliness, stress and the build-up of tensions which may seek release in casual or 
commercial sex.9 Significantly of course, deployment away from home implies human 
mobility which, when linked to high risk sexual practices and greater frequency of 
sexual encounters, suggests an increased risk of HIV being spread. However there is 
no evidence that those militaries engaged in conflict acquire significantly higher HIV 
prevalence as a consequence,10 suggesting that the risk is to populations 
encountering militaries rather than to militaries. The figures most often cited for 
prevalence rates amongst militaries (not least by UNAIDS) were between two and 
five times those of the general population.11 In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, 
infection rates amongst the military were often cited as being especially high, with 
claims that a number of militaries are experiencing rates above 50%.12 Figures are 
still not available for many rebel groups, but these were generally believed to be 
similarly high if not higher,13 while concern was also expressed over the vulnerability 
                                                                                                                                            
amongst recruits of the German military‟ European Journal of Medical Research 30 (April 
2003): 154-60; E. van der Ryst, G. Joubert, F. Steyn, C. Heunis, J. Le Roux, and C. 
Williamson, „HIV/AIDS related knowledge, attitudes and practices among South African 
military recruits‟, South African Medical Journal 91(July 2001): 587-91 ; Harley Feldbaum, 
Kelley Lee and Preeti Patel, „The national security implications of HIV/AIDS‟, PLoS 3 (June 
2006), e171; and  Elbe, „HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of war‟. 
9
  UNAIDS, Uniformed Services Programming Guide, pp7-10 and On The Front Line 3rd 
edition, 12 and 26-37;  NIE 99-17D, The Global Infectious Disease Threat;  ICG, HIV/AIDS as 
a Security Issue, pp.20-1; Ostergard, „Politics in the hot zone‟, 343; Peter Chalk, „Infectious 
disease and the threat to national security‟, Jane’s Intelligence Review September 2001, 49; 
Alan du Pont, HIV/AIDS: A Major International Security Issue, Asia Pacific Ministerial Meeting 
October 2001 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), 7; Verstegen, HIV/AIDS, 16;  
Bratt, „Blue condoms‟, 71; Schneider and Moodie, The Destabilising Impact, 6; Tripodi and 
Patel, „The global impact of HIV/AIDS‟, 54-7; Elbe, „HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of 
war‟, 164. 
10
  Ba and others, „HIV/AIDS in African militaries‟. 
11
  For example, UNAIDS, Technical Update: AIDS and the military, May 1998 (Geneva/New 
York, UNAIDS, 1998); UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care among Armed Forces and 
UN Peacekeepers: the Case of Eritrea (Geneva/New York: UNAIDS, 2003), 8. 
12
  UNAIDS, On the Front Line 1st edition (Geneva/New York: UNAIDS, 2003), 5-6; US 
National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for 
the United States, National Intelligence Estimate NIE99-17D (Washington: CIA, 2000), 
available at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/report/nie99-17d.html; Lindy Heinecken, 
„Facing a merciless enemy: HIV/AIDS and the South African armed forces‟, Armed Forces 
and Society 29 (winter 2003), 784; Robert L. Ostergard Jr., „Politics in the hot zone: AIDS and 
national security in Africa‟, Third World Quarterly, 23 (April 2002), 343; International Crisis 
Group (ICG), HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue (Brussels: ICG, 2001), ii and Lessons from 
Uganda, 2-3; Mark Schneider and Michael Moodie, The Destabilising Impact of HIV/AIDS 
(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002), 2; Paolo Tripodi and 
Preeti Patel, „The global impact of HIV/AIDS on peace support operations‟, International 
Peacekeeping, 9 (Autumn 2002), 54 table 1; 
13
  For example Docking, AIDS and Violent Conflict, 7. But in contrast see de Waal, „HIV/AIDS 






of child soldiers to HIV infection.14  
 
Conflict can also lead to the mass movement of people as they attempt to flee 
violence. Since human mobility is a key vector for the spread of HIV, analysts initially 
drew a straightforward link: conflict can lead to the spread of the disease though 
human migration.15 Kalipeni et al for example argued that „There is little doubt that 
the transmission of HIV in east Africa is related to patterns of population movements 
and interpersonal relations in the region‟.16 Refugee camps in particular were 
highlighted as a key concern for the spread of HIV. Health education, including HIV 
awareness, and more general support may be lacking in such camps. In the Goma 
refugee camp in Zaire for example, Bennett argues that the immediate concerns of a 
cholera outbreak and the high death tolls in the camp meant that health workers had 
little spare capacity in which to promote HIV awareness.17 People in camps are also 
usually at a socio-economic disadvantage and women in particular may be forced 
into sex for food, water or other means of survival (what is sometimes referred to as 
„transactional sex‟, often involving multiple partners). Moreover the weak position in 
which women may find themselves in refugee camps means that they are also 
vulnerable to rape and other forms of sexual violence.18 
 
Conflict can also cause changes in sexual behaviour. One report by the 
UNAIDS/WHO sponsored Global Coalition on Women and AIDS for example stated 
starkly that sexual violence against women is a „feature of all recent conflicts‟.19 A 
2002 Human Rights Watch report on the DRC argued that the conflict there had 
                                                                                                                                            
and the military‟, 7. 
14
  For example KS Subramanian, Impact of Conflict on HIV/AIDS in South Asia (2002), 50, 
available at http://aidsportal.org/store/770.pdf. See also PW Singer, „AIDS and international 
security‟, Survival 44 (Spring 2002), 150-1. Though Ciantia sounds a note of caution, Filippo 
Ciantia, „HIV seroprevalence in northern Uganda‟, Journal of Medicine and the Person 2 
(December 2004), 174. 
15
  Bratt, „Blue condoms‟, 71; UNAIDS, „AIDS and conflict: a growing problem worldwide‟ in 
2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic  (Geneva: UNAIDS/WHO, 2004), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/GAR2004_html/GAR2004_12_en.htm#P1704_379265; 
Rene Bennett, The Correlation between Conflict and the Spread of HIV/AIDS to Women 
available at http://www.sit-edu-geneva.ch/conflicthiv_and.htm, 14. 
16
  Quoted in Bennett, Correlation, 14. 
17
  Bennett, Correlation, 23. 
18
   Bennett, Correlation, 14. See also below. 
19
  Global Coalition on Women and AIDS, „Sexual violence in conflict settings and the risk of 
HIV‟, Violence Against Women and HIV/AIDS Information Bulletin Series no.2 (2004), 1. See 
also UNICEF, Children, Armed Conflict and HIV/AIDS (New York: UNICEF, 2003), 2-3; Mock 
and others, „Conflict and HIV‟, 7; Subramanian, Impact of Conflict on HIV/AIDS, 49; Nguyen 
and Stovel, The Social Science of HIV/AIDS, 11; Mbow and Webb, „HIV/AIDS affected 
children‟, 50. 






created a situation where abusive sexual relationships were more acceptable and 
that men regarded sex as a service obtainable by force.20 This has been linked to a 
growing concern that rape is being used as a weapon of war. A variety of conflicts, 
including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, the DRC and Liberia, all demonstrated 
evidence of this. As Singer wrote in 2002, „AIDS has created a new tie between rape 
and genocide. Rape itself is certainly nothing new to warfare... [But] the introduction 
of AIDS makes such programs a genocidal practice.‟21 Perhaps the most heavily 
cited conflict in this respect was Rwanda. In 2003 for example UNICEF reported a 
study of 2000 women raped during the conflict, of whom 80% were HIV positive five 
years later.22 The violence of the act of rape, making bleeding more likely, and the 
probability that a condom will not be used, heightens the risk of transmission. These 
concerns were also linked to the strong probability that if rape was a feature of a 
conflict then the militaries would be involved. Given the perception of a high HIV 
prevalence amongst militaries, the risk factors appeared to be piling up, suggesting a 
link between conflict, rape and the spread of HIV. 
 
Another commonly cited risk factor concerned health systems. The destruction or 
degradation of health services is common in conflict, and their reconstruction 
afterwards is often slow. The conflict in Sierra Leone left only 38% of its health units 
working; in Rwanda the number of health workers was reduced by four-fifths through 
death, injury, or flight. In addition to the impact on health workers, buildings may be 
destroyed, drug supplies plundered, and supply routes interrupted preventing the 
distribution of new drugs. The result for HIV is a potentially dramatic reduction in HIV 
education, prevention and treatment. The capacity to recognise HIV may be 
significantly affected if trained personnel or specialised diagnostic kits are not 
available, while utilisation of health services may be affected if people are unwilling or 
unable to visit health centres either because of the dangers of moving in a conflict 
area, or because they do not trust the health workers. Moreover there is evidence 
that in conflicts health systems adapt to reduce the emphasis on primary care, 
focusing instead on secondary and tertiary care, while available resources become 
                                                 
20
  Human Rights Watch, The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls 
in Eastern Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
21
  Singer, „AIDS and international security‟, 152-3. See also Dan Thomas, „AIDS 2006: 
conflict makes girls and women even more vulnerable to HIV‟, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/aids/index_35317.html, accessed 12 May 2008; UNAIDS, „AIDS and 
conflict‟; Bennett, Correlation,13; Verstegen, HIV/AIDS, 4; [No author] „The Democratic 
Republic of Congo [DRC]: a country raped by all types of men‟, Womens World 34 (1999), 22-
3. 
22
  UNICEF, Children, Armed Conflict, op cit. But see also the case study on Rwanda below. 






more concentrated in urban areas at the cost of rural. The result is a reduction in 
general health care and education, with evidence pointing to high regional variations 
in knowledge of HIV as a consequence of changes in health provision.23  
 
Conflict may also affect the care of people living with HIV and AIDS. In particular 
current treatment regimes prescribe a „cocktail‟ of drugs (ARTs) which need to be 
precisely sequenced. Vulnerability of supply places those individuals on ARTs at high 
risk, while drug resistance may develop if treatment programmes are poorly 
managed.24 In their study of the impact of the 2002 conflict in Cote d‟Ivoire on health 
care systems, for example, Betsi et al concluded that the prevention and care of HIV 
was significantly reduced as a direct result of conflict, further evidenced by the 
increase in STIs after the conflict (albeit with regional variations).25 
 
Although there was evidence from some conflicts that once conflict ended then the 
spread of HIV was reduced,26 concerns were also expressed that the end of a conflict 
may introduce new risk factors. In particular, communities protected from HIV 
because of isolation during a conflict may be exposed as they are reintegrated; as 
freedom of movement returns so human mobility may increase, risking the spread of 
HIV;27 refugees may develop high HIV prevalence rates, and bring this back with 
them on their return; and soldiers may also return with higher rates of infection, as 
was seen with Ugandan soldiers returning from the DRC.28 Probably the greatest 
focus of interest however was on the relationship between HIV and peacekeeping, 
not least in discussions of the UNSC in 2000 and 2001, and in UNSCR 1308.29 Two 
concerns are prominent: that peacekeepers may be at increased risk from HIV if 
deployed to regions with a high prevalence of HIV; and that peacekeepers may act 
                                                 
23
  See for example Mock and others, „Conflict and HIV‟; Bennett, Correlation, 15; 
Subramanian, Impact of Conflict, 51; Anthony B. Zwi, Antonio Ulgalde and Patricia Roberts, 
„Effect of war and political violence on health services‟, Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and 
Conflict Vol.1 (Academic Press, 1999), 683-5; Bratt, „Blue condoms‟, 71-2; Elbe, „HIV/AIDS 
and the changing landscape of war‟, 172. 
24
  Ellman and others, „Treatment of AIDS‟, 2 and 4, although the authors also point out that 
the movement of people living with HIV or AIDS to refugee camps may make ARTs easier to 
administer. See also Tony Barnett, „Mapping the future of HIV/AIDS, Security and Conflict in 
Africa‟, paper presented to Justice Africa/LSE AIDS Joint NGO/Academic Seminar, King‟s 
College London 6 December 2005, 1.  
25
  Betsi and others, „Effect of armed conflict‟, 359-64. 
26
  Betsi and others, „Effect of armed conflict‟, 363. 
27
  Mock and others, „Conflict and HIV‟ . 
28
  Verstegen, HIV/AIDS, 5. See also Fourie and Schonteich, „Africa‟s new security threat‟, 7. 
29
  „Peacekeeping‟ here is used in a broad sense, encompassing what are sometimes termed 
„peace support operations‟ and humanitarian interventions as well as the more traditional 
monitoring of peace agreements. 






as vectors for the spread of HIV, as appears to have occurred in both Sierra Leone 
and Cambodia.30 This second concern was exacerbated by allegations of sexual 




By the early years of this decade therefore a consensus had emerged that conflict 
led to the spread of HIV, a consensus supported by the identification of a range of 
risk factors. The latter included high levels of HIV amongst the military, conflict 
induced migration, changes in sexual behaviour especially increases in violent sexual 
relations,  reductions in health care systems, and new risks emerging in post-conflict 
situations especially relating to peacekeeping. Within a few years however, further 
research was beginning to suggest that the links were more complex than first 
imagined.32 Some long conflicts demonstrated little change in HIV prevalence, while 
a number of conflicts saw HIV prevalence reduce. The latter suggested that in some 
circumstances conflict, far from accelerating the spread of the disease, might 
ironically act as a braking mechanism. The case of Angola was highlighted as 
particularly important in this respect.33 UNAIDS remarked in 2005 that „largely due to 
the internal armed conflict, the Angolan HIV prevalence appears considerably lower 
than in neighbouring countries. This suggests that the restricted mobility as a result 
of the conflict may have slowed the spread of HIV in the country.‟34 As more empirical 
evidence emerged, so Alex de Waal began to argue that far from conflict spreading 
HIV with a number of exceptions, the reverse might actually prove to be the norm 
despite the risk factors involved.35 Similarly in a major 2007 study of the available 
data on HIV, conflict and refugees, the UN‟s High Commissioner for Refugees, Paul 
Spiegel, and academic colleagues concluded that „there is insufficient evidence that 
                                                 
30
  Bratt, „Blue condoms‟, 68; Schneider and Moodie, The Destabilising Impact, 8; Chalk, 
„Infectious disease‟, 49; UNAIDS, On the Front Line 1st edition, p.6 Table 2. 
31
  United Nations, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and 
abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations Report A/59/710 (New York: United Nations, 2005), 
paras 3-10, 44 and 62. See also UNSC Press Release SC/8400, 31 May 2005, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8400.htm. Ironically, the ready availability of 
condoms to peacekeepers - distributed as a means of protecting them against HIV - was seen 
by some soldiers as an unofficial endorsement of sexual exploitation. 
32
  See for example Paul B. Spiegel, „HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displaced 
populations: dispelling myths and taking action‟, Disasters 28 (September 2004): 323. 
33
  Hence the choice of Angola as one of the four case studies examined below. 
34
  UNAIDS, On the Front Line 3rd edition (Geneva: UNAIDS/WHO, 2005), 26. 
35
  Alex de Waal, „HIV/AIDS and the military‟, 8. De Waal‟s skepticism was reinforced by his 
doubt over the extent to which uniformed services experienced higher levels of HIV 
prevalence. 






HIV transmission increases in populations affected by conflict. Furthermore, there are 
insufficient data to conclude that refugees fleeing conflict have a higher prevalence of 
HIV infection than do their surrounding host communities‟.36 
 
The empirical evidence was not alone in being questioned. The risk factors which 
had formed such an important part of the initial consensus also began to look more 
complex. Studies on prevalence rates in the military conducted through the decade 
suggested that they were highly case dependent and subject to a number of 
variables.37 Moreover both national militaries and UNAIDS have been acting to 
prevent the spread of HIV through awareness programmes,38 although the success 
of such training appears to be case dependent. The picture is also more complicated 
with regard to conflict induced migration and refugees. In their 2007 study, Spiegel et 
al argued that out of 12 refugee camps for which high quality data was available 
across 7 African conflicts, three quarters demonstrated lower prevalence rates than 
the surrounding hosts.39 In NE Kenya, refugee camps demonstrated low prevalence 
rates despite a high incidence of rape in the early 1990s, though it is speculated that 
this may have been because of low HIV prevalence amongst the rapists at the time.40 
Similarly, continued low HIV prevalence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite widespread 
population displacement and rape in the 1990s, may also be accounted for by low 
initial prevalence.41 On the other hand, the low prevalence rates amongst Angolan 
refugees returning after the conflict has been explained by the effective HIV 
awareness campaigns conducted in the refugee camps  in neighbouring countries.42 
As regards changes in sexual behaviour as a risk factor, although there seems little 
                                                 
36
  Spiegel and others, „Prevalence of HIV infection‟, 2192. Although it should be emphasised 
that the point is not that there is no link, but that substantial empirical evidence to support 
such a conjecture is currently lacking while evidence to support the opposite is available. 
37
  UNAIDS, On the Front Line 3rd edition, p.27; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(NMFA), HIV/AIDS, Security and Democracy, Seminar Report, Clingendael Institute, 4 May 
2005, 5. 
38
  On possible initiatives to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in militaries, see UNAIDS 
Uniformed Services Programming Guide (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2003). See also Martin 
Foreman, Combat AIDS: HIV and the World’s Armed Forces (London: Healthlink Worldwide, 
2002), 37-48; UNAIDS Initiative on HIV/AIDS and Security: Third Quarterly Report (2002), 
available at http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/pht/UNAIDS_initiative_HIV_security/en/ ; 
ICG, Lessons from Uganda, 3, 8-9 and 14. The UN‟s AIDS awareness card is available from 
Awareness@unaids.org. For details on the card see UNAIDS Uniformed Services 
Programming Guide, 12.   
39
  Spiegel and others, „Prevalence of HIV infection‟, 2007. See also Richard Walker, „UNHCR 
study challenges assumptions about refugees and HIV spread‟, AIDSPortal news, available at 
http://www.aidsportal.org/News_Details.aspx?id=5215&nex=51, accessed 12 May 2008; 
UNAIDS, „AIDS and conflict‟. 
40
  de Waal, „HIV/AIDS and the military‟, 8. 
41
  UNAIDS, „AIDS and conflict‟. 






doubt that rape occurred on a horrendously large scale in Rwanda, Spiegel et al 
question the reliability of much of the data linking this to HIV infection.43 Moreover, 
the impact of conflict on health systems is not straightforward. If there was little or no 
health care readily available to the majority of people, either because access was 
limited or because services were simply not present, then conflict is unlikely to have 
a major impact in this respect.44 Nor is the data on the links between HIV and 
peacekeeping as clear cut as it may have initially appeared. With the exception of 
Sierra Leone there appears to be little or no linkage between UN peacekeeping 
missions and high prevalence. In Africa a number of states with the long established 
peacekeeping missions have amongst the lowest HIV prevalence rates (for example, 
Angola, Eritrea and Somalia).45   
 
The link between conflict and the spread of HIV does not now appear to be a 
straightforward causal relationship – neither the empirical evidence nor a closer 
examination of the risk factors support this conclusion. This does not however mean 
that the relationship does not exist. Even critics of the orthodox account accept that 
conflict may lead to the spread of HIV. As Spiegel et al comment, „Displaced 
populations and those affected by conflict are clearly at risk of HIV transmission. 
Furthermore, to expect that incidence of HIV infection will be high in survivors of 
conflict and rape is understandable‟.46 In 2005 UNAIDS admitted that „little reliable 
information is available on levels of HIV infection among uniformed services. Few 
countries conduct systematic screening and public health surveillance systems are 
often weak‟,47 while in a major survey of available data on 21 African militaries 
published in 2008, Oumar Ba and colleagues concluded that „HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rates in most African militaries are significantly elevated compared to their host 
communities‟.48  Moreover explaining the reduced HIV prevalence in Angola on 
limited mobility (as UNAIDS did) does not bear comparison with Rwanda where, 
                                                                                                                                            
42
  UNAIDS, „AIDS and conflict‟. 
43
  Spiegel and others, „Prevalence of HIV infection‟, 2191. 
44
  Zwi and others, „Effect of war‟. 
45
  Data for this comparison was taken from: UNAIDS‟ annual epidemic updates (see above); 
UN DPKO, Background Note: 31 December 2005 available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/bnote.htm#unmil, last accessed 26 January 2006; US General 
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despite several million refugees as a result of the 1994 genocide and widespread 
allegations of rape, population wide levels of HIV did not increase. The relationship is 
therefore increasingly accepted as a more complex one than originally envisaged.49  
 
Despite the acceptance of added complexity to the risk factors involved, however, 
there still appears to be little explanation as to why in some conflicts HIV prevalence 
rates have not increased. What is required is a more nuanced explanation of the 
relationship between conflict and the spread of HIV. The following section therefore 
moves beyond these risk factors to develop a framework which explains this. The 
framework is not intended to be rigidly deterministic; rather it suggests a number of 
important factors and their relationship in terms of susceptibility and vulnerability. It 
suggests that when either susceptibility or vulnerability is low, then the likelihood is 
that HIV will not be spread as a result of conflict. The subsequent sections use this 
framework in four case studies of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa where HIV was not 
spread. 
 
Conflict and the spread of HIV: a framework 
Key to the explanation offered here is the recognition that it is not conflict but specific 
types of changes which might occur because of conflict which lead to increased HIV 
prevalence. If these changes do not occur, or more accurately if they do not occur at 
a sufficient level of incidence, then HIV prevalence is unlikely to increase significantly 
as a result of conflict. But even these changes are not sufficient. Rather a number of 
pre-existing background conditions also need to be in place. Here it is useful to 
distinguish between susceptibility and vulnerability.50  A number of background 
factors can be identified which render a state susceptible to increased HIV 
prevalence, but these do not in themselves mean such a state will experience 
increased prevalence in times of conflict; rather a different range of changes 
introduced by conflict make it vulnerable to increased prevalence. States need to be 
both susceptible and vulnerable for conflict to be a significant risk factor in the spread 
of HIV.  
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In the first part of this framework, five background factors can be identified as 
contributing to a state‟s susceptibility. The first of these is the current HIV prevalence 
rate: if levels are low then it is unlikely that conflict will lead to a significant spread of 
the disease simply because there are insufficient numbers of HIV positive people to 
spread the disease. In addition, the stage an epidemic is at may prove important 
since there are certain times when the disease is more easily spread, not least just 
after infection when the viral load spikes.51 To what extent this is true at community 
level rather than individual however is uncertain. Second, there is considerable 
epidemiological data linking population density to the spread of infectious diseases, 
and HIV is no exception here. Thus if a conflict is conducted in a remote, rural area 
with low population density then susceptibility is unlikely to be high. Once population 
density increases, either because of where the conflict is being fought or because of 
migration, then susceptibility increases. Third, since human mobility is key to the 
spread of HIV, then the transport and communication infrastructure is an important 
factor in determining susceptibility.52 Good infrastructure will facilitate the movement 
of people during conflict – either refugees fleeing the conflict or troops engaged in 
fighting. The corollary is that poor transport links will allow remote communities, 
especially those in areas with a low population density, to remain isolated. Fourth, 
the scale and nature of conflict may prove to be significant. If a conflict is limited in 
geographic scale and in numbers involved, then it may lack the effective mass to 
generate the spread of the disease. But if the nature of a conflict is one of identity 
within states rather than a war  of acquisition between states, then this may generate 
a heightened level of antipathy between communities which renders acts of sexual 
violence more likely. The duration of a conflict may also prove to be an important 
factor, allowing time for vulnerabilities to manifest as well as creating a sense of 
desperation and futility which makes the risks from sexual behaviour less significant. 
However longer conflicts may also lead to the increased isolation of communities, 
protecting them from the spread of the disease (as appears to have been the case in 
Angola and southern Sudan), as well as depression leading to a loss of libido. The 
final and perhaps weakest factor in terms of susceptibility is poverty. Infectious 
diseases often attack the poor disproportionately, but there is growing evidence to 
suggest that this is not the case for HIV in Africa. Rather, England argues that  
demographic and health surveys of Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania suggest higher 
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prevalence amongst middle classes.53 In its 2008 report on the global epidemic, 
UNAIDS argued that „HIV has no socio-economic boundaries. However... [t]he 
disproportionate burden of HIV in low-income countries, and the more severe impact 
of the disease on poor households, often lead to the assumption that HIV is a 
“disease of poverty”. In fact, the relationship between absolute poverty and the risk of 
infection is more nuanced, being also highly dependent on context.‟54 However 
poverty may have an impact on susceptibility in three ways: it may force increasing 
numbers of women into prostitution for economic survival; there is some evidence 
from South Africa that poorer women are more vulnerable to rape;55 and malnutrition 
has a well established detrimental impact on the immune system.56 
    
The second part of this framework, vulnerability, concerns four changes which may 
occur as a result of conflict. The first of these is dissasortive mixing. One of the 
striking features of conflict is the potential for mobile groups to mix in new ways. 
Refugees may seek to flee conflicts by moving from rural areas to urban (or vice 
versa), from one region of a state to another, or across borders; militaries will 
encounter new groups of civilians and may be expanded with new recruits 
(sometimes forcibly and from new areas); new sexual networks may emerge, 
consensual, casual, commercial, transactional or violent; etc. What is crucial for the 
spread of HIV is not so much the movement of people but the degree to which they 
mix with new communities. If communities do not mix, then changes in HIV 
prevalence are less likely. But when communities mix then vulnerability is higher.57 
What is also significant is a differential rate of prevalence between two communities, 
such that when a community with a low incidence of HIV encounters through conflict 
one with markedly higher rates, then susceptibility is increased. Second, since the 
major means by which HIV is spread remains unprotected sex, changes in sexual 
behaviour as a consequence of conflict represents an important factor. There is a 
substantial body of literature stretching over centuries, and including the last decade, 
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which suggests that sexual practices can and do change in conflict. Casual sexual 
encounters, infidelity, sexual predation and numbers of partners can all increase 
during conflict for a variety of reasons – stress, changing norms over acceptable 
sexual behaviour, peer group pressure, hypermasculinity etc. Changes in social 
perceptions and interactions through conflict can also influence patterns of 
aggression, not least in respect of sexual violence and rape of women, all of which 
may increase vulnerability to the spread of HIV.58 However conflict can also lead to 
depression and trauma. Empirical evidence exists, particularly in post-conflict 
settings, of increased levels of depression affecting libido and sexual behaviour with 
a consequent potential impact on the spread of HIV.59 A second major cause of HIV 
infection is unsafe injections of drugs, usually associated with drug abuse. There is 
considerable evidence that drug abuse may increase in conflict situations (not least 
alcohol abuse, but also narcotics). There is therefore a prima facie case that 
increased injecting drug abuse might occur, thereby in turn increasing vulnerability to 
HIV infection. There has been little discussion of this however and empirical evidence 
is scant, attention instead focusing upon the sexual transmission of HIV. This may 
however need to change given the increased incidence of conflict in areas which 
produce narcotics and across established drug routes (especially Afghanistan); fears 
of increased HIV prevalence in the Russian military, where drug abuse is a 
recognised problem; and the emergence of injecting drug abuse in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However the low incidence of injecting drug abuse in sub-Saharan Africa until 
recently suggests that this may not have been a significant issue during recent 
conflicts in that region. Finally changes in health support, including education, can 
affect vulnerability. HIV awareness, availability of diagnostic kits, supply (and use) of 
condoms as well as the care and treatment of people living with HIV may all suffer as 
health services are interrupted by conflict or resources diverted within the health 
services from primary to secondary and tertiary care. But health provision may also 
be improved if previous levels of supply were inadequate (either through lack of 
capacity or through unequal availability).  How health services and HIV awareness is 
affected by conflict therefore remains a major variable in assessing vulnerability.  
 
What follows is an initial examination of this framework by surveying four states from 
sub-Saharan Africa which have recently experienced violent conflicts. The four were 
chosen  because all have suffered demonstrated some of the risk factors identified in 
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orthodox accounts, but none saw a significantly heightened HIV epidemic as a 
consequence of conflict. Why was this, and specifically can this be explained using 
the framework identified above?  
 
Each case study follows a similar pattern.60 The first part briefly describes the 
conflict, its intensity and identifies the traditional risk factors present. The second part 
discusses susceptibility and the third vulnerability to increases in HIV prevalence 
levels using the factors identified in the framework above. To provide a common 
basis for comparison, a number of multi-country datasets were used. These include 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on conflict intensity; UNAIDS and WHO data on 
the spread of HIV;61 reports produced by states for  the UN General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS); WHO data on epidemiology and country 
health systems; UNDP data on poverty and development; and data from the World 
Bank on transport infrastructure. In addition searches on Google Scholar and 
PubMed using a limited number of key words identified a number of relevant country 
specific studies.  
 
Sierra Leone  
The Conflict62  
The conflict in Sierra Leone ran from 1991 to 2000. For most of this period it was 
classified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as a „minor conflict‟, but in 1998 and 
1999 violence escalated to the level of „war‟. Initially the conflict was based in the 
diamond rich south and east of the country, with the rebel RUF based in Liberia. No 
part of the country appears to have been wholly immune however, with the conflict 
spreading to the northern province in 1994 and the capital Freetown being the site for 
a two week „killing spree‟ by the RUF in 1999.  Three risk factors can be identified. 
First, sexual violence and rape was widespread during the conflict, especially but not 
exclusively by the RUF who also forced young women into becoming „bush wives‟. 
Second, perhaps half of Sierra Leone‟s population of over 4M were forced to leave 
their homes at some time. One report estimated that even in 2001 there were still 
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300,000 registered IDPs and between 500,000 and 1 million unregistered IDPs.63 
Third, a large number of foreign troops were based in Sierra Leone, usually as 
peacekeepers. These included at various times ECOWAS troops (mainly from 
Nigeria and Guinea), two UN missions, the use of a South African private security 
firm and a „humanitarian intervention‟ by the British military. In 1999 alone, there 
were some 17,500 UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone from 30 countries.64 All of 
these are traditionally considered to be major risk factors for the spread of HIV in 
conflict; but although Sierra Leone does have significant levels of HIV, they fall below 
the regional norm. Crucial in explaining this is Sierra Leone‟s low susceptibility to 
conflict driven HIV increases.  
 
Susceptibility  
A key element in susceptibility is existing HIV prevalence. Although no large scale 
assessments of HIV prevalence were conducted until after the conflict (the first being 
conducted by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2002),65 both the 
Word Bank and UNAIDS estimate that in the early 1990s prevalence rates were low. 
The first cases of HIV were reported in 1987 in the southern and eastern provinces – 
the regions where early fighting also occurred.66 The World Bank estimated that in 
1991 when the fighting began prevalence rates were 0.4%, while UNAIDS estimates 
were even lower. Although UNAIDS figures suggest a gradual increase in prevalence 
through the 1990s, by the end of the conflict HIV prevalence amongst the key 15-49 
age group was still significantly lower than the regional average (in 2003, 1% 
compared to a regional average of 7%). By 2007 UNAIDS‟ estimate was a 
prevalence rate of 1.7%, suggesting a possible acceleration post-conflict but still well 
below regional average.67 Although prevalence appears to be higher  in urban 
compared to rural areas (especially the capital Freetown), this is a fairly standard 
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phenomenon, though some small scale studies of commercial sex workers and the 
military suggest significantly higher prevalence rates in these sub-groups post-
conflict.68 No data exists for these groups prior to the conflict.  
 
Other factors identified as affecting susceptibility are population density, transport 
infrastructure,  the scale of the conflict and levels of poverty. Average population 
density in 1990 was 57 people per square kilometre, increasing in 1995 to 58 and in 
2000 to 63.69 Although regional variations exist, in rural areas which make up most of 
the country population density appears to have been consistently low.70 Transport 
similarly was poor for the duration of the conflict. In the early 1990s only 11% of 
roads were paved, reducing to 8% in the late 1990s.71 Although the figures cited 
above on IDPs suggest considerable movement of people, it is not clear how far and 
how quickly they moved. The geographic scale of the conflict was considerable, 
eventually affecting the whole country. But it was only in 1998 and 1999 that the 
UCDP changed its classification from „minor conflict‟ to „war‟. Although the army of 
Sierra Leone was initially only 3,000, this was bolstered by ECOWAS, private 
security contractors  and eventually one of the largest UN peacekeeping forces. 
These numbers are especially significant given Sierra Leone‟s comparatively small 
population. As significant is the nature of the conflict, where violence against civilians 
and human rights abuses were commonplace.72 Finally Sierra Leone was and 
remains one of the poorest nations on earth, with over 70% of the population living 
below the poverty line and over one quarter unable to meet basic food needs.73 This 
is reinforced by the UNDP‟s annual reports on human development, which 
consistently place Sierra Leone near the bottom of its human poverty index.74  
 
Overall Sierra Leone‟s susceptibility to increased HIV prevalence as a result of 
conflict appears to have been low. Crucially pre-existing prevalence rates were low, 
population density was low, transport infrastructure was poor (although conflict-
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induced migration was high), and although the conflict spread widely and despite 
human rights abuses, for much of its duration the UCDP rated it as „minor‟. The one 
clear factor suggesting susceptibility was the high level of poverty, but as suggested 
above this appears to be a comparatively weak factor in determining overall levels of 
susceptibility.  
 
Vulnerability   
One of the key factors in increasing vulnerability during conflict is mixing between 
different communities, especially between communities with different prevalence 
rates. Data on this however is difficult to obtain, although a number of inferences can 
be drawn. Although there was very significant movement because of the conflict, 
much of this was internal to Sierra Leone limiting the potential to mix with other 
communities.75 The major opportunity for disassortive mixing therefore appears to 
have been with foreign troops, especially peacekeepers. One estimate claims that 
32% of peacekeepers came from states with HIV prevalence rates of over 5%, while 
the Nigerian military (which formed a very significant part of the ECOWAS force) had 
an estimated HIV prevalence of 10-20%.76 Peacekeepers were the primary clients for 
commercial sex workers, which by the end of the conflict had a significantly higher 
prevalence of HIV than the general population. One report estimated prevalence 
amongst CSWs in 2005 at 8.5% compared to 1.5% for the general population, while 
another report suggested that over 70% of CSWs in Freetown were HIV positive.77 If 
this abnormally high rate is explained by increased exposure to HIV positive militaries 
from outside Sierra Leone, then the comparatively low prevalence in the general 
population implies low dissasortive mixing between foreign militaries and the general 
population. One may therefore tentatively conclude that disassortive mixing was low. 
Levels of injecting drug abuse also appear to have been low. Again data for the 
conflict is unavailable, but in the CDC‟s 2002 survey only 0.4% of respondents 
between 12 and 49 reported injecting drugs within the previous 12 months, although 
50-60% had shared needles.78 As regards sexual behaviour, rape appears to have 
been commonplace as a result of the conflict – the UCDP commenting for example 
that rape was „rampant when RUF attacked villages and cities, which it did more 
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often than attacking regular troops‟79. Moreover the 2005-06 UNGASS country report 
on Sierra Leone identifies a pattern of high risk sexual behaviour including low 
condom use, high numbers of sexual partners, high levels of sexual violence and the 
breakdown of the extended family structure.80  Despite this there is no evidence of a 
sharp increase in prevalence rates amongst women which might be expected as 
result of this, and especially as a result of violent sexual behaviour during the conflict. 
At a population level there is little difference in prevalence rates between men and 
women, while crucially in a post war survey women in the 15-24 age group showed 
the highest prevalence rates, rather than those in older age groups who would 
presumably been most at risk during the conflict.81 Finally, Sierra Leone‟s health 
system was devastated by the conflict so that by the end of the conflict comparisons 
with regional norms indicated severe weaknesses.82 Unsurprisingly given this, 
knowledge about HIV, including transmission of the disease, was poor in the early 
years of this decade and condom use low. Post-conflict interventions have however 
seen signs of improvement especially in terms of both awareness and condom use.83  
 
In summary then, although it is difficult to determine the level of disassortive mixing, 
the indications are that this was low; intravenous drug abuse was also low; although 
rape, sexual violence and high risk sexual behaviour appears to have been common, 
this does not seem to have translated into dramatic increases in seroprevalence; and 
HIV awareness and prevention was low, a result of Sierra Leone‟s poor health 
system. Overall therefore vulnerability appears to be mixed with some factors 
registering strongly but others much less so.  
 
Angola  
The Conflict  
Angola became independent from Portugal in November 1975 and immediately 
entered into an internal conflict between rival independence groupings, principally 
between the Cuban backed MPLA government and South African/US backed UNITA 
rebels. The conflict lasted until 2002, with only brief periods of ceasefire. For much of 
the period since 1989 (when the UCDP database begins) the conflict was classified 
as „war‟, the exceptions being 1995 (after the UN brokered peace agreement of 
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1994) and 2002, the year the conflict ended, when it was classified as „minor‟. The 
conflict affected most of the country at various times, though the MPLA government 
held most of the major towns throughout while for long periods UNITA actions were 
largely in rural areas.84 In terms of traditional risk factors, the conflict was protracted 
and widespread with a significant percentage of the population mobilised to fight.85 
Although research conducted after the conflict indicated that Angolan soldiers 
engaged in risky sexual practices,86 the prevalence rate of 3.9% amongst military in 
urban areas in 2003 was identical to that of the general adult population.87  Reports 
of widespread sexual violence during the conflict are scarce. Although the UNDP in 
its 2007/08 Human Development Report cited data from IDMC that in 2006 there 
were still some 62,000 IDPs, suggesting that refugees were a feature of the conflict, 
they make it clear that these figures have a high level of uncertainty attached to 
them.88 Foreign involvement was limited after the withdrawal of Cuban and South 
African forces in the late 1980s until the involvement of Namibia in December 1999. 
Communications seems to have been particularly affected by the conflict, with 
transport internally and externally severely affected. Overall then, despite the length 
of the conflict and its high level of violence, orthodox factors suggest that the Angola 
would not be especially at risk. This is supported by the available data on HIV 
prevalence, although such data is limited especially for the period of the conflict. 
Some sentinel surveillance data of women reporting to ante-natal clinics (ANC) is 
available, although sometimes patchily so, while no general population survey is 
available for the conflict period. The best available estimates are that by the end of 
the 1980s prevalence rates were extremely low, but that through the 1990s there was 
a steady increase to just under 2% of the population by the end of the conflict (3.9% 
of adult population in 2003, compared to a regional average of 7.1%). Since the end 
of the conflict there has been a levelling off of prevalence rates measured as a 
percentage of the population, though numbers of people living with HIV have almost 
doubled this decade.89  
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As the Angolan conflict pre-dated the emergence of HIV, pre-existing prevalence 
rates are zero. Population density is also very low, the median variant in 1975 being 
5 people per square kilometre, rising slowly to 11 in 2000 and 13 in 2005.90 The 
conflict is widely seen as limiting human mobility rather than prompting large refugee 
flows,91 while the percentage of paved roads was virtually zero for the 1980s and 
1990s suggesting poor transport infrastructure.92 And although the conflict lasted the 
best part of three decades and at various times affected large parts of the whole 
country, at other times it was largely confined to the extremely lowly populated rural 
areas, while there are no reports of widespread sexual violence. All of these suggest 
a very low level of susceptibility to the spread of HIV during conflict. The only factor 
running against this trend is poverty. Angola is one of the poorest nations on earth. 
By the end of the war well over half of its population lived below the poverty line and 
one quarter in extreme poverty.93   
 
Vulnerability  
Assessing disassortive mixing during the conflict is extremely difficult. There are no 
indications that the conflict led to increased disassortive mixing, though this may be 
more a product of the difficulties involved in obtaining evidence. It is also difficult to 
gauge how behaviour has changed given both a lack of data and the length of the 
conflict. Although recent data identifies the mean age of sexual debut as 16 and a 
high rate of multiple sexual partners, it is unclear whether or not the conflict has had 
any significant impact on this or on levels of sexual violence. Although the military 
have been identified as engaging in particularly risky behaviour with regard to HIV 
transmission, prevalence rates are roughly the same as the general population.94  
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There is also a lack of data on injecting drug abuse in Angola, though the indications 
are that this is not a factor in increasing vulnerability.95 Similarly, although there is 
data on the health service in Angola after the conflict – below regional average 
numbers in most key health service professions and in life expectancy – there is 
considerable difficulty in determining the extent to which this deteriorated as a result 
of the conflict. Interestingly though, although life expectancy is considerably lower 
than the regional norm (by c.20%) the percentage who die of AIDS related causes is 
less than half the regional norm. This suggests that the poor health system did not 
contribute to a significant increase in HIV.96 Overall therefore it is extremely difficult to 
gauge how vulnerable Angola was to HIV spreading as a result of conflict, though the 
indications are that it was not particularly vulnerable.  
 
Rwanda  
The Conflict97  
Although most attention has focused on the 1994 genocide of the Tutsis by rival 
Hutus, the Rwandan conflict lasted from October 1990 to March 2002 with two main 
phases (1990-94 and 1997-2002). The first of these phases was mainly internal, 
though with foreign involvement. The second was fought largely outside Rwanda in 
the eastern DRC, though its origins lie heavily with the Rwandan refugees who fled 
there. The Uppsala Conflict Program Database lists 1991-2, 1998 and 2001 as „war‟ 
and the remaining years as „minor‟ conflict.98 In terms of traditional risk factors, 
Rwanda appears to have been vulnerable to the spread of HIV for three reasons. 
First, the conflict was ethnic in nature with considerable hate propaganda culminating 
in the 1994 genocide. Stories of widespread rape during the genocide are 
commonplace.99 Second, there was considerable external involvement in the 
Rwandan conflict, including troops from Zaire, Uganda and Burundi as well as a UN 
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peacekeeping force, while the second phase of the conflict took place largely on 
Congolese territory. Third, refugee flows were considerable, not least in 1994 when 
first one million fled with the fall of the Hutu-led government, and two million more as 
a consequence of the genocide.  
 
Susceptibility  
Of the factors contributing to susceptibility, data on HIV prevalence in Rwanda began 
to emerge with sentinel surveillance surveys in the 1980s. With some exceptions, 
these continued through the 1990s and this decade, supplemented by population 
based surveys. Crucially, Rwanda suffered an „explosive‟ outbreak of HIV in the mid-
late 1980s immediately prior to the conflict, similar to that of neighbouring 
countries.100 Prevalence rates appear to have been especially high in urban areas, 
though the outbreak was also widely spread throughout rural areas as well.  Of the 
other factors contributing to susceptibility, Rwanda has one of the highest population 
densities in the world, albeit with a significant dip in the mid-1990s after the 
genocide.101 It is also one of the poorest countries in the world: in 2006, over half the 
country was living below the poverty line (compared with a regional average of 44%), 
while the UNDP placed it at 161 on its development index.102 All of these factors 
suggest a high degree of susceptibility. The scale and nature of the conflict is 
perhaps a less clear cut factor, though again on balance suggestive of susceptibility. 
Through the early 1990s ethnic tensions escalated and violence against civilians was 
commonplace culminating in the 1994 genocide. Although large areas of the country 
were involved at various points during the conflict, including the capital Kigali where 
the highest HIV prevalence rates were recorded, the degree of violence varied. Of 
the years between 1990 and 2002, the UCDP only cite 4 as crossing the threshold 
into „war‟, and two of these were periods where much of the conflict was fought 
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outside Rwanda.103 Also less clear cut is transport. Infrastructure was poor 
throughout the conflict with a very low percentage of roads paved, small numbers of 
buses and the Ministry of Transport and Communications declared „defunct‟ in 1997. 
This suggests that for much of the conflict mobility was hindered by the poor level of 
transport.104 Nevertheless the refugee flows, especially the two major exoduses of 
1994, suggests the ability of large numbers of people to move, albeit perhaps in 
extremis.  
 
Overall it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Rwanda was highly susceptible to a 
further increase in HIV prevalence as a result of conflict. Prevalence rates were high 
at the beginning of conflict, population density was high and so were levels of 
poverty. The conflict was widespread with high levels of ethnic tensions and 
extensive reporting of rape, especially during the genocide, while the refugee flows 
suggest a degree of human mobility. However, during the period of conflict in the 
1990s and into the twenty-first century, prevalence rates fell consistently. In 1990 
adult HIV prevalence was c.9% with an estimated 250,000 HIV positive adults; in 
2001 this had fallen to 190,000 and in 2007 to 150,000 with a prevalence rate of less 
than 3%.105 This can only be partially explained by doubts over data on rape, the 
fluctuating levels of violence over the 12 years and the poor level of transport 
infrastructure.  
 
Vulnerability   
Of the four factors contributing to vulnerability, the most difficult to assess is the level 
of disassortive mixing as a result of the conflict. The potential for such mixing clearly 
existed, not least as a result of the two major refugee flows of 1994, the widespread 
rape of Tutsi women by Hutus during the genocide, and the involvement of external 
militaries. But there are also reasons to suspect that the actual extent of disassortive 
mixing may not have been as high as might be thought from this. The refugee flows 
were along ethnic lines and communities may well have retained a degree of 
coherence as a consequence; the numbers of foreign militaries were not high and the 
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second part of the conflict was fought almost entirely outside Rwanda; and although 
Tutsi women may have suffered terribly during the genocide, the impact on wider 
prevalence rates appears to have been limited. At present, there is no evidence of 
extensive disassortive mixing as a consequence of the conflict.  
 
As regards changes in sexual behaviour, despite a relatively late age of sexual debut 
and low levels of multiple partnerships, risky sexual behaviour prior to the conflict 
appears to have been high, as implied by the high national prevalence rate. In 
particular social restrictions on the use of condoms persisted, as did a low level of 
knowledge on how HIV was transmitted. HIV prevalence amongst commercial sex 
workers appears to have been very high – two surveys in Butare in 1983 and 1984 
revealed prevalence rates of 75% and 88% respectively – while in 2000 only 26% of 
CSWs could demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge of how HIV was 
transmitted.106 Crucial to any discussion of this however are the events of the 
genocide. Reports of systematic rape during the genocide are commonplace, as are 
claims that rape was used as a weapon of war with deliberate attempts to infect Tutsi 
women with HIV. A typical example of this view is Paula Donovan:  
 
Integral to the plan to annihilate the Tutsi population was the systematic 
sexual molestation, mutilation, and rape of women and girls...Most 
survivors describe the genocide as a bloodbath during which rape was 
inevitable for practically all females... Eyewitnesses recounted later that 
marauders carrying the virus described their intentions to their victims: 
they were going to rape and infect them as an ultimate punishment that 
would guarantee long-suffering and death.107  
 
While there is little doubt that the genocide represented one of the most appallingly 
brutal acts of the twentieth century, the impact on HIV prevalence is less clear cut. 
Donovan herself admits that it is impossible to calculate how many women who were 
raped were subsequently killed; while how many of the rapists who stated they were 
HIV positive actually were is difficult to know – not least because testing was not 
extensive within Rwanda until the introduction of voluntary counselling and testing 
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(VCT) in 1997.108 Although Donovan claims that the rape of Tutsi women contributed 
to a subsequent increase in HIV prevalence in Rwanda,109 UNAIDS data shows not 
only that the national prevalence rate continued to decline throughout the 1990s, but 
that HIV  prevalence amongst pregnant women in urban areas of Rwanda declined in 
the years after the genocide.110 Moreover the impact of rape on population wide HIV 
levels appears to be less significant than some initially believed. Following Spiegel 
and colleagues‟ earlier work, in 2008 Aranka Anema and colleagues modelled the 
impact of rape on population wide levels of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. Their 
conclusion was that „even in the most extreme situations... widespread rape in 
conflict-affected countries in [sub-Saharan Africa] has not incurred a major direct 
population-level change in HIV prevalence‟.111 This is not to say that rape did not 
occur in Rwanda, nor that women were not infected as a consequence. Rather what 
it suggests is that at a population level, rape as a weapon of war is not a sufficient 
change in sexual behaviour to significantly increase vulnerability, and that this 
appears to have been the case in Rwanda.  
 
Of the two final factors in assessing vulnerability, injecting drug abuse appears to be 
rare in Rwanda although data is limited.112 A more important issue therefore is the 
health system and in particular those elements focused on HIV and AIDS. In the mid-
1980s the Rwandan Ministry of Health together with the Red Cross initiated a series 
of developments to combat the spread of HIV, including blood screening and AIDS 
awareness campaigns. Although the genocide had a devastating effect on these 
services, the impact appears to have been relatively short lived. During the second 
phase of the conflict a series of major programmes were begun, including voluntary 
counselling and testing, prevention of mother to child transmission and access to 
anti-retroviral therapies. By the end of the conflict Rwanda was already experiencing 
a „rapid scale-up of HIV prevention, care, and treatment programmes.‟113  
 
Overall therefore, vulnerability appears to have been low. There is no evidence of 
increased disassortive mixing; despite the evidence of rape during the genocide, 
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changed sexual practices do not appear to have been a significant factor given the 
high level of risky behaviour already apparent;  injecting drug abuse was not an 
issue; and the health services, especially those focused on HIV, improved during the 
second phase of the conflict despite the devastation of the genocide.  
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)  
The Conflict  
Although low level violence was fairly common in Zaire from the early 1960s on, in 
the 1990s this escalated as the Zairean army and local population began to attack 
the ethnic Tutsi Banyamuleges in the eastern part of the country. The large number 
of Hutu refugees from Rwanda after the 1994 genocide added a further dimension to 
the violence against the Banyamuleges, as well as beginning a series of cross-border 
raids with Rwanda. The conflict however is usually dated from October 1996 when an 
organised struggle emerged involving an alliance of Banyamuleges and anti-
government groups against the Mobutu government. The rebels advanced quickly on 
the capital Kinshasa, helped both by local discontent with Mobutu and external aid 
from Rwanda and Uganda, overthrowing the government in May 1997. In August 
1998 however, violence broke out once more as the former allies turned on each 
other, with Mobutuist and external involvement adding to a complex mix of often 
fractious groupings. This phase of the conflict ended in 2001, only for violence to re-
emerge in 2006 with a splinter grouping from the Banyamuleges. The UCDP 
describes the four years 1997-2000 as „war‟, with the other years „minor conflict‟. It 
identifies seven foreign governments as providing troops to the conflict as well as UN 
peacekeepers and a number of rebel groups from other states. The second phase of 
the conflict also saw the emergence of militia groups consisting of disaffected youths 
from the eastern part of the country increasingly involved in the violence.114  
 
In terms of traditional risk factors, the conflict in the DRC would appear to be 
vulnerable to an increase in HIV prevalence, not least as a result of the high level of 
violence for four years, the ethnic dimension to the conflict, allegations of extensive 
rape especially in the eastern parts of the country, and the involvement of foreign 
militaries. In addition there was a large influx of refugees from Rwanda in the 1990s 
                                                 
114
 Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) country page from Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
database, available at:  http://www.ucdp.uu.se last accessed 6 October 2008. Hereafter 
UCDP, DRC. 






as well as internally displaced people (1.1M in 2006).115 But the available data116 
suggests that after a steep initial rise in sero-prevalence during the early 1980s, by 
the mid-late 1980s this had levelled off and has remained fairly constant since, 
despite the decade long period of conflict. In 2003, just after the second phase of the 
conflict, prevalence levels amongst 15-49 year olds was at 4.2% (compared to 7.1% 
for the region), roughly the same as it had been in the late 1980s and early 1990s.117 
Prevalence rates amongst vulnerable groups are predictably higher but again fail to 
show a significant increase during the conflict. Female sex workers in Kinshashe for 
example demonstrated sero-prevalence rates of 27% in 1985 rising to 38% in 1989, 
but dropping to 29% in 1997 and to 22% in 2002.118 However there are two 
significant exceptions to this general trend. The first is with pregnant women outside 
urban areas. In 1993 and again 1997, sero-prevalence for this group was in the order 
of 4%, but this more than doubled in 1999 to 8.5%, dropping to just under 6% the 
following year and to just over 4% in 2003.119 That this corresponds to the peaking of 
the conflict may be significant, but it fails to translate into a more general population-
wide increase in sero-prevalence. Second, Spiegel identifies a significant increase in 
HIV prevalence in the eastern part of the DRC (between 15% and 24%), where the 
violence was at its worst.120 Spiegel‟s source for this however appears to be a single 
report from Save the Children based on a part of the region of North Katanga, while 
other reports suggest little regional variation in the epidemic.121  
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With a generalised HIV epidemic present since the mid-1980s, it would appear that 
pre-existing sero-prevalence created significant susceptibility to an increase in HIV 
prevalence. However, levels had been relatively stable for a decade prior to the 
conflict, and remained so during the conflict. This might suggest that factors outside 
the conflict had already limited the scale of the epidemic in the DRC, and that the 
onset of conflict was a less important variable than these other factors; however the 
fact that sero-prevalence in the DRC is lower than the regional average alternately 
suggests that higher prevalence levels might have been possible. Population density 
is relatively low, at 19 per square kilometre in 1995 rising to 22 in 2000. Between 30-
40% of these live in urban areas however, leaving the extensive rural areas (where 
much of the conflict was fought) with a significantly lower population density.122 
Transport infrastructure is similarly poor with less than 2% of roads paved.123 
Although the conflict had a strong ethnic dimension and significant external 
involvement, both suggesting heightened susceptibility, the focus was frequently 
limited to the rural east of the country. Interestingly, there appears to be no significant 
regional differences in prevalence levels, despite this focus.124 Finally, levels of 
poverty are high, with the DRC ranked 168th on the UNDP‟s Human Development 
Index in 2007 and 88th on its Human Poverty Index, just above Angola and 10 places 
below Rwanda.125 
 
The DRC‟s susceptibility to conflict-induced increases in HIV prevalence is difficult to 
assess. Population density and poor transport infrastructure both suggest low 
susceptibility, and although poverty levels were high this is the weakest of the factors 
involved in determining susceptibility. The impact of the scale and nature of the 
conflict is mixed. On the one hand the ethnic dimension and involvement of external 
powers would seem to suggest that this would contribute significantly to 
susceptibility, but these are mitigated by the fact that the conflict was not solely inter-
ethnic and that its focus was often limited geographically to the rural east. Existing 
sero-prevalence levels would also seem to indicate high susceptibility, but the fact 
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that the epidemic seems to have reached a stable plateau is suggestive of powerful 
limiting factors in place.  
 
Vulnerability  
The potential for disassortive mixing in the DRC during the conflict was clearly high. 
Not least the large number of states and other groups providing soldiers, and the 
large number of refugees (from Rwanda as well as IDPs), both suggest the possibility 
of disassortive mixing. Gauging the extent of such mixing however is difficult and 
there is little directly available evidence either way. Indirectly the drop in HIV 
prevalence amongst sex workers may suggest that foreign militaries (and others) did 
not engage in risky sexual behaviour with this group during the conflict, though the 
rise in HIV prevalence amongst pregnant women in rural areas may imply some 
mixing. Neither of these phenomena however lead to firm conclusions.  
 
As regards changes in behaviour, risky sexual practices appear to have been 
commonplace in the DRC prior to the conflict, as implied by the existence of a 
generalised HIV epidemic. Significant indicators of this are the relatively low age of 
sexual debut, low condom use with non-regular partners (even by 2005, only one fifth 
of young men used condoms with non-regular partners while in 2001 overall condom 
use was 2.3%), high incidence of multiple sexual partnerships, and the high HIV 
prevalence rates amongst female sex workers (38% in Kinshasa in 1989).126 Reports 
of rape during the conflict in the DRC are commonplace, especially in the eastern 
part of the country, as well as reports of women being used as sexual slaves by the 
military.127 Although Spiegel notes that these reports are anecdotal,128 it is difficult not 
to conclude that rape occurred as a result of conflict, especially in the eastern part of 
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the DRC. The extent of this however is difficult to gauge, while as Anema and others 
note, the linkage between rape and an increase in generalised HIV prevalence is not 
robust.129 Mulanga and others also note that conflict may have caused behavioural 
changes which reduced the likely spread of HIV. In particular they note that reduced 
purchasing power by professionals may have led to a decrease in their use of 
commercial sex workers, while reduced movement and social life may also have had 
a limiting effect on risky behaviour.130 As with other sub-Saharan states, injecting 
drug abuse appears to have been extremely low and not a significant factor in 
increasing the DRC‟s  vulnerability.131 The health system however does appear to 
have been badly affected by the conflict. Although it is difficult to find data on access 
to health care prior to the conflict, there seems to be little doubt that the system has 
suffered and that the density of health care professionals is very low.132 
 
In conclusion then, although a case may be made that the DRC was more vulnerable 
to an increase in HIV prevalence as a result of conflict, the degree is not great and 
equally the reverse may be argued. The extent of disassortive mixing is unclear; 
some changes in sexual behaviour may have added to the degree of vulnerability, 
but this is limited by the risky sexual behaviour commonplace in the country prior to 
the conflict and changes introduced as a result of conflict which reduced risk; 
injecting drug abuse appears not to have been an issue; but the health system does 




The results of the case studies are summarised in Table 1. In all of them, risk factors 
fail to explain what occurred in terms of HIV prevalence rates. In three of the cases, 
risk factors were high, but in Rwanda prevalence fell, in the DRC prevalence 
remained the same while in Sierra Leone it increased albeit remaining significantly 
lower than the regional norm. In the fourth case study, Angola, conflict preceded the 
HIV pandemic; although risk factors were low, HIV did emerge and prevalence rates 
increased, but at levels far lower than those elsewhere in the region. In conclusion 
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then, the absence of significant risk factors does not appear to explain satisfactorily 
why some conflict states do not see the expected increase in HIV. In contrast the 
framework suggested above does appear to offer greater explanatory power. None of 
the four cases demonstrate both susceptibility and vulnerability, although some may 
demonstrate one of these while in the case of the DRC the results for both are mixed. 
What this appears to suggest is that, despite the fears of a few years ago, conflict 
does not readily act as a vector for HIV, tough the potential for this to occur does still 
exist under certain circumstances. 
 
This result nevertheless needs to be qualified. First, cases often demonstrated local 
factors at work in determining HIV prevalence. Assessing the significance of these – 
for example the fact that prevalence levels in the DRC had plateaued well in advance 
of conflict – is difficult, but intuitively appear to be significant. Second, interpretations 
of the available data need to be nuanced and treated with care. Data is also often 
missing – not least in assessing disassortive mixing, which is accomplished by 
inference; is patchy; or is of varying reliability. Third, the impact of rape in war on HIV 
levels appears to be a problematic variable. Recent work suggests, counter-
intuitively, that rape in war does not translate into significantly higher HIV prevalence 
amongst the general population even when sero-prevalence rates are high, an 
assessment somewhat borne out by the above analysis (especially in Rwanda). But 
data on rape is notoriously difficult to establish, while the number of women raped 
who were subsequently killed may also be a major factor in explaining the limited 
transmission of HIV into the general population. Also it is not clear whether the threat 
of infection is used by men who do not know whether they are HIV positive or not, 
simply because of the terror this may induce – as may have been the case in 
Rwanda. The impact upon women who have been raped in this manner cannot be 
anything other than traumatic, but may also lead to a belief that HIV has been widely 
transmitted when in fact it has not. Fourth, other changes in sexual behaviour are 
also difficult to assess. This is partly because of lack of data during conflict – often 
because the dangers involved in conflict interrupts surveys. But it is also because a 
generalised HIV epidemic prior to conflict may be associated with risky sexual 
behaviour. Gauging the extent of change during conflict when risky sexual behaviour 
is already prevalent, and whether such changes are meaningful in terms of 
increasing the risk of HIV transmission is difficult. Fifth, injecting drug abuse does not 
appear to have been an issue in sub-Saharan Africa, but it may prove to be 
elsewhere. In particular changing patterns of drug routes during this decade coupled 






to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may prove significant factors in the spread of HIV 
in those areas. There is also growing evidence of injecting drug abuse emerging in 
sub-Saharan Africa, including Sierra Leone, which may suggest that in the future this 
may be more of a factor than it appears to have been over the last two decades.133 
And sixth, because those most directly involved in conflict are also those in the age 
group most at risk from HIV it is possible that transmission rates were higher than the 
data suggests but a significant proportion of those with HIV were killed before the 
disease was identified. Data on HIV prevalence – especially population wide surveys 
- is often collected after a conflict with the result that prevalence rates amongst those 
killed in conflict – including civilians – remains unknown.  
 
This paper attempted to address the question of why, despite the presence of risk 
factors, HIV prevalence rates do not always increase in conflict situations. It offered a 
more nuanced framework to explain this, one based on susceptibility and 
vulnerability. In so doing it attempted to answer a negative – why something did not 
happen. Further work is now required to establish whether this framework is equally 
valid in explaining when HIV prevalence rates do increase. 
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 Risk factor Changes in HIV prevalence Susceptibility Vulnerability 
Sierra Leone High Increased, but remained 
significantly below regional 
norm 
Low Mixed 
Angola Low Conflict preceded HIV 
pandemic; prevalence 
increased steadily through 
1990s but at significantly 
lower rates than regional 
norm. 
Low Difficult to assess, but 
indications suggest low. 
Rwanda High Fell during period of conflict. High Low, despite rape during 
genocide. 
DRC High Generalised epidemic which 
levelled off before conflict at 
lower than regional norm; no 





Table 1: Summary of Case Studies
HIV, AIDS and Conflict in Africa 
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